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COMMENT

CORPORATE COUNSELS' LACK OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE ACTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The role of an attorney has changed over time. Several hundred

years ago, attorneys worked independently as either barristers or

counselors providing legal services and advice to clients.' With the

industrial revolution and the growth of business enterprises, the legal
profession has expanded. Many lawyers continue to serve multiple
clients, but in addition, a growing number of attorneys have chosen
to serve only one client, usually a business, association, or corporation. 2 This comment is directed toward the new role of this corporate
3

attorney.
The role of the corporate attorney is both distinct from and
similar to the more traditional role of the multi-client lawyer. Both

kinds of attorneys use their knowledge of the law to guide and protect
clients. Further, no matter how many clients an attorney has, the
attorney still functions as a representative of the court and seeks
administration of justice. 4 However, the corporate attorney serves one
client and functions as an employee of that client.' While the rela1. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
CALIF. L. Rv. 1061, 1070 (1978). In addition, England and several other countries
continue to divide lawyers into two categories: barristers and solicitors.
2. Kalish, The Attorney's Role in the Private Organization, 59 NEB. L. Rnv.
1, 1-3 (1980).
3. The term "corporate attorney" is used in this article to refer to an attorney
who is employed solely by one employer. This term is also used by the American
Corporate Counsel Association which is "the only professional association by and
for attorney-employees of private institutional clients." Calendar, 5 ACCA DOCKET
3 (Summer 1987). This position may also be referred to as that of "house counsel."
A house counsel has been defined as a "[l]awyer who acts as attorney for business
though carried as an employee of that business and not as an independent lawyer."
Black's Law Dictionary 666 (5th ed. 1979).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities 5 (1989).
5. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 553, 554 (1988). The following statistics represent the categories of the 655,191
7 2
attorneys within the United States in 1985: Private practice- 0. %; Federal judici-
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tionship between the attorney and his 6 client is essential to the lawyer's
role as legal advocate and counselor, this relationship may be unique
in the context of corporate counsel. 7
A fundamental aspect of the attorney-client relationship is that
the communication between the attorney and client is usually confidential and therefore not open to disclosure.8 The question then arises
whether, and to what extent, the confidential nature of the relationship
prohibits the corporate attorney from asserting his own personal rights
against his client. 9 More specifically, what are corporate counsels'
ary-.5070; Federal government-3.1%; State/local judiciary-2.9%; State/local government-5.0%; Private industry-9.7%; Private association-.8070; Legal aid/public
defender-l.2%o; Education-1.1%; Retired/inactive-5.6%. ABA's Supplement To
The Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S. Legal Profession in 1985. Eliminating from
the total those attorneys working in private practice, in the judiciary, or that are
retired/inactive, there are 136,279 lawyers who are categorized as "employees." In
reality, the number of lawyers as employees is much greater because many attorneys
working in private practice serve not as partner/employers, but as associate/employees.
6. The use of the masculine pronoun in this article is meant to be all
encompassing and to include both male and female persons.
7. Hazard, supra note 1, at 1061; Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life &
Health Ins., 150 Il. App. 3d 21, 26, 501 N.E.2d 343, 346 (1986).
8. Hazard, supra note 1, at 1061.
9. Professional rules provide guidelines as to the confidential nature of the
attorney-client relationship. Specifically, Canon 4 of the Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility states "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a
client." Rule 4-101 of Canon 4 states:
(a) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing to or would
likely be detrimental to the client.
(b) Except when permitted under Rules 4-101(c) and (d), a lawyer shall not
knowingly, during or after termination of the professional relationship to
his client,
(1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client;
(2) use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client; or
(3) use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself
or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(c) A lawyer shall disclose information about a client to the extent it appears
necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would result in
death or serious bodily harm to another person, and to the extent required
by law or the rules of professional conduct.
(d) A lawyer may reveal
(1) confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients
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options when fired for refusing to participate in the employer's illegal

activities? Can an attorney challenge such a termination on the
grounds that he was acting as an ethical and conscientious officer of
the court? This conflict between an attorney's personal rights and
ethical obligations was addressed in Herbster v. North Am. Co. for
Life & Health Ins.'0 In Herbster, the Illinois Second District Court of
Appeals held that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge is not
available to corporate counsel. 1

affected, but only after a full disclosure to them;
(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under disciplinary rules or
required by law or court order;
(3) the intention of a client to commit a crime in circumstances other
than those enumerated in paragraph (c) above; or
(4) confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of
wrongful conduct.
(e) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or
using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may permit an
employee to reveal the information allowed by Rule 4-101(c) and 4-101(d).
(f) The relationship of trained intervenor and a lawyer or a judge who seeks
or receives assistance through the Lawyers' Assistance Program, Inc. shall
be the same as that of attorney and client for purposes of the application
of Rules 1-103, 4-101 and 7-102(b).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 4-101 (1985).

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state:
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and
except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1989).
10. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21,
501 N.E.2d 343 (1986), appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d 545, 508 N.E.2d 728, cert. denied,
484 U.S. 850 (1987).
11. Id. at 30, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
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This comment examines Herbster and similar cases and determines that these decisions lack a sound analytical foundation for
denying retaliatory discharge actions to corporate attorneys. Because
the rulings in these cases are based upon the uniqueness of the
attorney-client relationship, Part II presents a brief historical review
of retaliatory discharge and the attorney-client relationship. Part III
analyzes Herbster and later cases and their harmful impact on the
legal profession. Finally, Part IV examines alternatives to the Herbster
holding which present ways that attorneys in the future may have a
retaliatory discharge cause of action.
II.

BACKGROUND OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

The retaliatory discharge 2 cause of action was initially devised
by the courts to protect individuals filing for workers' compensation. 3
The workers' compensation system was created by state legislatures
to provide a method for an employee to recover losses caused by
work-related injuries without requiring a showing of fault. 4 The
courts created the remedy of retaliatory discharge in response to
employee terminations in retaliation for filing claims under workers'
compensation statutes. The Indiana Supreme Court was the first court
to allow the retaliatory discharge cause of action in Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Co."' The court acknowledged that under the
usual rule of employment at will, an employee could be legally
discharged for any reason or even no reason. 16 However, in the case
of a discharge for a workers' compensation claim, the court allowed
the retaliatory discharge tort stating that the employer had committed
12. The phrase "retaliatory discharge" was used by the Herbster court. Id.
"Wrongful discharge" can be used to represent the same cause of action.
13. Love, Retaliatory Dischargefor Filing a Worker's Compensation Claim:
The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 552 (1986).
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1439 (5th ed. 1979). The Illinois Worker's

Compensation Act, enacted in 1951, states that it is "to promote the general welfare
of the people of this State by providing compensation for accidental injuries or death
suffered in the course of employment .... ." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138
(1987).

15. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
16. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 253, 297 N.E.2d 425,
428 (1973). Specifically, the employment at will doctrine provides that an employer
could fire an employee who was hired for an indefinite period "for good cause, for
no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal
wrong." Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on
other grounds.
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an "intentional, wrongful act"' 7 which violated a statutory right
provided to the employee by the legislature. Since Frampton, twentyseven jurisdictions have developed a retaliatory discharge remedy
8
specifically for workers' compensation. In addition, the retaliatory
discharge cause of action is available to employees who have been
discharged for a variety of reasons, including reporting criminal
activity to the police.' 9

The prima facie case for retaliatory discharge is composed of

three elements: 20 1) the employee must be exercising a constitutional
22
or statutory right; 21 2) the employee must have been discharged; and
17. Frampton, 260 Ind. at 250, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
18. Love, supra note 13, at 554-55. These jurisdictions are composed of the
following: Eleven states recognize a common-law action: Illinois-Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Indiana-Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Kansas-Murphy v. City of TopekaShawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981);
Kentucky-Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983); MichiganGoins v. Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich. App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983); NevadaHansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); New Jersey-Lally v.
Copygraphics, Inc., 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); New Mexico-Vigil v. Arzola,
699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Oregon-Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298
Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984); Tennessee-Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d
441 (Tenn. 1984); West Virginia-Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d
178 (W. Va. 1980). Six states have statutes: Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-290a (West Supp. 1985); Minnesota-MINN. STAT. ANN. 176.82 (West Supp.
1985); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon Supp. 1986); North CarolinaN.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, 5-6 (West
Supp. 1985); Texas-TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1986). Three states
allow equitable relief: Ohio-Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123,90 (Page 1980); OregonOR. REV. STAT. § 659.121, .410, .415, .420 (1983); Virginia-VA. CODE § 65.1-40.1
(Supp. 1985). Two states allow a civil penalty: Louisiana-LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:1361 (West Supp. 1985); Wisconsin-WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.35 (West Supp. 1985).
Six states allow an administrative remedy: California-CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West
STAT. ANN. § 31-290a (West Supp. 1985);
§ 378-31 to -38 (1976 & Supp. 1984); Maine-ME. REV.

Supp. 1986); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN.

Hawaii-HAw.

REv. STAT.

STAT. ANN. 34.15-39.1 (West
(McKinney Supp. 1986).
§
120
LAW
CoMp.
WORK.
Supp. 1985); New York-N.Y.
19. Employees have also been protected by anti-retaliatory discharge statutes
in the reporting of health and safety violations. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
42.40.010 - 42.40.900 (West Supp. 1987); see also Reynolds, supra note 5, at 557.
STAT.

ANN. tit. 39,

§ 111 (1984); New Jersey-N.J.

20. Love, supra note 13, at 566-67. See generally Krauskopf, Employment
Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule, 51 U.M.K.C. L. REV.

189, 243-49 (1983).
21. Love, supra note 13, at 566-67. E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d
172, 181, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978) (employee prevailed in asserting her statutory
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3) there must be a relationship between the employee's constitutional
23
or statutory rights and the dismissal.
The first element, that the employee must have a constitutional
or statutory right, can be shown in a variety of ways. In general, the
employee can sue for retaliatory discharge if he has filed a good faith
claim based upon specific state legislation such as a workers' compensation act, whistle blowing statute, or other legislation.2 4 The specific
constitutional or statutory rights upon which a cause of action may
be predicated can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.25
The second element of the action requires proof that the employee
was discharged. The meaning of the term "discharge," however, has
been the subject of some controversy. Where state legislatures have
created a statutory retaliatory discharge cause of action, they have
had difficulties in determining whether the threat to discharge, demote, or reassign can fulfill the discharge requirement. 26 Generally,
however, the "discharge" element is fulfilled by the employee actually
being terminated from his employment. 27
The third element requires proof that the employer dismissed the
employee because the employee was pursuing his own right. 2 The
right may have been created by statute, constitution, or public policy. 29
This can be very difficult to prove if the employee must show that
the retaliation was the only reason for the dismissal.3 0 In many
2d 520, 528-29, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357-58 (1985) (employee failed because complaint

did not allege a violation of public policy; the first amendment is a restriction on the

government).
22. Love, supra note 13, at 566-67. E.g., Bryce v. Johnson & Johnson, 115 II.
App. 3d 913, 921, 450 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (1983) (no retaliatory discharge action

where employee had not been discharged or constructively discharged).
23. Love, supra note 13, at 566-67. E.g., Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet,

113 Wis. 2d 561, 568, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983) (employee failed through lack of

constitutional and statutory public policy).
24. Love, supra note 13, at 568. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.237 (301) (11)
(Callahan 1985); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361 (West 1985).
25. Love, supra note 13, at 568. E.g., Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666
S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983) (employee's claim must include a violation of a constitutional
or statutory right).
26. See Delano v. City of South Portland, 405 A.2d 222 (Me. 1979); Bryce v.
Johnson & Johnson, 115 Ill. App. 3d 913, 450 N.E.2d 1235 (1983).

27. Note, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.-Illinois Courts Welcome Retaliatory Dis-

charge Suits Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1980 U. ILL. L. FORUM 839,

847.

28. Love, supra note 13, at 566.
29. Id.

30. Id. See Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (Employee
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jurisdictions, however, the employee must show that the employee's
exercise of a legal claim was either a significant factor or a determi31
native factor in the termination. To fulfill the significant factor test,
the employee must show that his exercise of his legal rights was an
32
"important motivating factor" in the termination. With the determinative factor test, the employee must show that "but for" the
employee's exercise of his legal right, the employer would not have
courts do not acknowledge or identify
fired him.33 In most cases,
34
used.
being
is
test
which
Access to information concerning the employer's motivation is
usually unavailable to the employee. For that reason, after the employee has met the three elements of the prima facie case, the burden
of proof then shifts to the employer to present a valid reason for the
dismissal.35
In Herbster, the Illinois Second District Court of Appeals recognized the previously established prima facie elements for the retaliatory discharge action.3 6 It also recognized the established principle
that the discharge must have been contrary to a "clearly mandated
public policy" before a retaliatory discharge cause of action would
be available. 7 As seen in Herbster, courts continue to balance the
value of the employment at will doctrine against the intentional actions
3
of the employer who wrongfully terminated an employee. " In addi-

was required to show that his refusal to perform an illegal act was the sole reason
for his termination. This is typically known as the "sole reason" test.).
31. See Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(employee was not required to show that pursuit of his legal right was the only reason
for his dismissal).
32. Love, supra note 13, at 571. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965)
a type of significant factor test called the substantial factor test: "The
uses
also
actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if his conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm."
33. Love, supra note 13, at 572. E.g., Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d
557, 559-60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (employee did not have to use the sole factor test
in order to prevail).
34. E.g., Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983).
35. Love, supra note 13, at 573. See generally Davis v. Richmond Special Rd.
Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (burden of proof shifts to defendant
after plaintiff establishes prima facie elements).
36. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 IlI. App. 3d 21,
23, 501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (1986).
37. Id.
38. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
876 (1981); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill.
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tion, the courts have had to envelope their decisions within the public's
concern over societal policies. 3 9 The actual scope of the public policy
sufficient to outweigh the fundamental principles in the employment
at will doctrine continues to be the core of the problem. °
Public policy has been categorized as that which "concerns what
is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively. "41 The general rule for differentiating between public policy
and individual concerns is that the issue "must strike at the heart of
a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities .... -42 Armed
with such "definitions," the courts have had to grapple with the
analytical problems created when public policies conflict. The issue
of retaliatory discharge involves such a conflict which the courts have
attempted to address.
The first policy argument which weighs against the retaliatory
discharge cause of action is the essential core of the employment at
will doctrine; the employer and employee share equally in the right to
terminate the employment at any time. 43 If the employee and employer
have equal standing, the employee is viewed as having been treated
fairly under the employment at will doctrine. This doctrine is well
established as public policy and is based upon an ideal model of fairminded individuals in a cooperative workplace, prospering in their
joint pursuits. The equal standing presumption exists, even though
the employer may fire the employee at any time, because the employee
also has the equal right to quit at any time. However, this argument
falsely presupposes an equal level of bargaining power between the
employer and the employee." The employee may actually have less
power in two important ways: family and economic commitments
may limit job mobility, and specialized work may limit the available
job market. 45 As a result, job security may be more dependent upon
the employer than ever before.4 6
39. "[Ilt is now recognized that a proper balance must be maintained among
the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, and the
employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public
policies carried out." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 11. 2d 124, 129,
421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981).
40. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 484-85 (1976). See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 559.
41. Palmateer, 85 Ill.2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
42. Id. at 128, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79.
43. Id. at 128, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
44. See Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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The second public policy conflict arises specifically from the
nature of attorney-client relationships. The public wants, and is
entitled to, adequate legal representation. This goal can best be served
by ensuring the confidentiality of attorney-client communications.
However, this policy conflicts with the public's desire to have crimes
or other anti-social activities revealed. Attorney-client confidentiality
also conflicts with the attorney's right to a retaliatory discharge cause
of action.
Because of their professional and ethical standing, attorneys
occupy a unique position by being parties to information that clients
can specify as confidential. 47 This information is protected by the
concepts of attorney-client confidentiality and privilege, 4 preventing
attorneys from breaching confidences in pursuit of their own or
others' interests. 49 The purpose of such controls is to promote open
discussions and disclosures between the attorney and client.50 Through
these controls and the rules of the legal profession, attorneys are
restricted in divulging client communications. However, the larger
issue is whether the confidentiality and privilege restrictions further
the public's desire for adequate legal representation to the extent that
the restrictions should override the public policy protecting an attorney's personal employment rights.
The concern about attorney-client confidentiality and privilege
applies to the corporate attorney as well as the general practitioner.
In many ways the ties between the corporate attorney and his client
are even stronger than those between a general practitioner and his
many clients.' The corporate attorney not only serves as a legal
advisor for the corporation, but is also an employee of the corporation. In this way, the corporate attorney depends totally upon the
corporation for his livelihood. This very dependency was at the heart
of the Herbster case.

47. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 I11.App. 3d 21,

27, 501 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1986).
48. 8 J. WIGMOE, EVIDENCE § 231, at 599 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6, supra note 9.

49. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 222 (N.D. I11. 1975)
(attorney was prohibited from representing both individual and corporate defendants
due to the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship and the potential

conflict of interest).

50. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 I11.2d 103, 117-18, 432
N.E.2d 250, 256 (1982).
51. See generally Kalish, The Attorney's Role in the Private Organization, 59
NEB. L. REV. 1 (1980).
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III. THE HERBSTER CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The plaintiff, Robert W. Herbster, brought suit for retaliatory
discharge against his former employer, North American Company for
Life & Health Insurance (North American).5 2 Herbster was the chief
legal officer and vice-president in charge of the legal department of
North American. Herbster alleged that in his capacity as the corporation's legal officer, he was requested by his employer to destroy
certain documents and records. The documents were the objects of a
request to produce by an opposing party in an action against North
American. After Herbster refused to destroy the materials, he was
fired."
Herbster argued that his right to a claim of retaliatory discharge
was the same as that of any other wrongfully discharged North
American employee.5 4 He claimed that his position with North American was his sole employment and that his duties were subject to
review by his superiors." He looked to North American for his job
security, salary, and career development.5 6 Herbster also argued that
destroying discovery materials would have violated his obligation
under the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility to refrain from
conduct that would interfere with the "administration of justice." 57
At trial, North American moved for summary judgment claiming

that a corporate attorney had no cause of action for retaliatory
discharge and that Herbster was never ordered to perform an illegal
act.5" The defendant claimed Herbster was terminated solely because
of the quality of Herbster's work.5 9 The trial court granted North
American's motion for summary judgment, but conceded that the
complaint stated a cause of action with material facts at issue 0 The
court stated, however, the public policy considerations invoked by the
alleged request to destroy discovery materials and the need for con52. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21,
23, 501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (1986).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 26, 501 N.E.2d at 346.
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. Id. at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344 (rule 1-102(a)(5) of the Illinois Code of
Professional Responsibility states in relevant part: "Misconduct-A lawyer shall not
...engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.").
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Partial Transcript of Trial Court Proceedings la-3a, Herbster v. North Am.
Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986) (No. 2-850042).
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fidentiality in the attorney-client relationship conflicted. 61 The trial
court determined that the policy preserving attorney-client confidentiality was paramount. 62 Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion despite the fact that the standard for summary judgment
63
was not met.
In the appeal to the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois,
Herbster argued that under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 4-101(d), a
lawyer may reveal confidential information when permitted under
disciplinary rules or required by statute or court ruling. 64 Further,
Herbster argued that he was fired for refusing to violate three separate
disciplinary rules of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility:
rule 1-102(a)(4) which prohibits an attorney from engaging in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation," rule
7-102(a)(7) which prohibits an attorney from assisting "his client in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent," and rule
7-109(a) which prohibits an attorney from suppressing "any evidence
that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce. ' ' 65 In
essence, Herbster was fired for upholding these rules in the same
manner as another employee is fired for filing a workers' compensation claim.
The Second District Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, but based its
decision on other grounds. 66 The appellate court held that corporate
attorneys do not have the right to a retaliatory discharge cause of
action. 67 This was a direct contrast to the trial court's determination
that Herbster had presented the prima facie elements for a retaliatory
discharge cause of action. 68 While acknowledging the many valid
public policy considerations, the appellate court raised and answered
the fundamental question of whether an attorney who is an employee69
of a corporation is entitled to bring a retaliatory discharge claim.

61. Id. at 2a-3a.
62. Id. at 3a.

63. Id.

64. See Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d
21, 23, 501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (1986); ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Rule 4-101(d), supra note 9.

65. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, Herbster v. North Am. Co. for
App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986).
Life & Health Ins., 150 I11.
66. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 30, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
67. Id.

68. See id.

69. Id. at 23-30, 501 N.E.2d at 344-48. The public policy considerations
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To answer that question, the court purported to analyze the history
of the retaliatory discharge tort and the necessity for treating attorneys
70
differently than other employees.
The appellate court traced the development of the retaliatory
discharge claim in Illinois by first identifying that the tort was an
exception to the employment at will doctrine.' In its examination of
the historical development of the tort in Illinois, the Herbster court
identified the most prominent cases and their holdings. In the first of
those cases, Kelsay v. Motorola,72 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that a retaliatory discharge claim was permissible when an employee
was discharged for pursuing a workers' compensation claim. 73 The
Herbster court analyzed the Kelsay decision and stated that "[tihe
[Kelsay] court refused to accept a construction of the [Workers'
Compensation] Act which allowed employers to place employees in
the position of choosing between their jobs and seeking compensation." ' 74 The Herbster court emphasized that Kelsay reflected the
growing need for a retaliatory discharge cause of action. 75
The Herbster court also reviewed Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co. 76 In Palmateer, the court stated that an employee had
a retaliatory discharge cause of action after being fired for supplying
information about his co-workers' suspected criminal activities to the
police. 77 The Herbster court then reviewed Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago,
Inc. 71 in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that a retaliatory
discharge claim was available even to a union member covered by a
collective-bargaining agreement with provisions for arbitration.7 9 While
the Herbster court acknowledged that the tort had been extended to

included the violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rules 1-102, 7-102(a)(3), and 7109(a), the conflict with the states' general discovery policies, e.g., Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982), and the resulting
obstruction of justice, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31-34(a) (1983).
70. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21,
24-26, 501 N.E.2d 343, 344-46 (1986).
71. Id. at 24, 501 N.E.2d at 344-45.
72. 74 Ill.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
73. Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 11. 2d 172, 189-90, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360-61 (1978).
74. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 24, 501 N.E.2d at 345.

75. See id.

76. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
77. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 127, 133, 421
N.E.2d 876, 887, 880 (1981).
78. 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
79. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 152, 473 N.E.2d 1280,
1284 (1984).
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apply to a wider range of plaintiffs,

0

it also noted that the common

law employment at will doctrine is still the law in Illinois. 8 The court
further noted that the Illinois Supreme Court does not "strongly8 2
support" the expansion of the retaliatory discharge cause of action.
The Herbster court recognized that Illinois courts have also placed

limitations upon the retaliatory discharge cause of action: employees

were prevented from suing supervisors instead of employers,83 and the
84
tort was limited by the pre-emption by or conflict with federal law.

In its examination of the history of retaliatory discharge, the

Herbster court reiterated the holdings of the cases, but failed to apply

them to its own deliberations. For example, the court made no
correlation between Kelsay and Herbster. In Kelsay, the employees

were being forced to choose between retaining their jobs and pursuing

their statutory right to receive workers' compensation benefits.

85

Sim-

ilarly, in Herbster, the attorney was forced to choose between keeping

his job or following the statute prohibiting interference with the
administration of justice, specifically the destruction of discovery
materials. The appellate court provided no explanation why the unfair
choice prohibited in Kelsay should not also be prohibited in Herbster.
As a result, Herbster was forced to make that unfair choice between
keeping his job and upholding the law.
In addition, while the Illinois courts have expanded the availability of the tort to include those employees who already had access
to arbitration, 86 the Herbster court denied the only cause of action

available to the corporate attorney. The Herbster court did cite cases
where restrictions were placed upon the retaliatory discharge tort, but
none of those cases was factually similar to Herbster.8 7 In tracing the
development of the retaliatory discharge tort, the Herbster court failed

80. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Il1. App. 3d 21,
25, 501 N.E.2d 343, 345 (1986).
81. Id. at 25-26, 501 N.E.2d at 345-46. See also Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co.,
106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985).
82. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 25-26, 501 N.E.2d at 345-46 (quoting Barr v.
Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (1985)).
83. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 26, 501 N.E.2d at 346. See also Morton v.
Hartigan, 145 11. App. 3d 417, 495 N.E.2d 1159 (1986).
84. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 26, 501 N.E.2d at 346. Cf. Wheeler v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985).
85. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11.2d 172, 182, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978).
86. E.g., Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 I11.2d 143, 150, 473 N.E.2d
1280, 1283-84 (1984).
87. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 I11.App. 3d 21,
24-26, 501 N.E.2d 343, 345-46 (1986). See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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to explain why it did not apply the rationale and holdings from the
earlier cases. Without such explanation, the Herbster court left its
decision without any foundation in the earlier retaliatory discharge
cases.
Without having supplied sound precedent for its decision, the
Herbster court then examined whether an attorney must be treated
differently than other employees. The court noted that Herbster was
subject to the control of his North American supervisors. However,
the court acknowledged that unlike other non-attorney North American employees, Herbster was also subject to the Code of Professional
Responsibility.88 The court stated that Illinois "attorneys occupy a
special position in our society" in that they are controlled by the
Illinois Supreme Court, Illinois statutes, and Illinois common law.8 9
The Herbster court identified many other factors which would
justify treating attorneys differently than other employees. The court
recognized the fiduciary duty of "fairness, good faith, and freedom
from undue influence" that the attorney owes the client. ° In addition,
the key to the attorney-client relationship is the confidence the client
must have in the attorney because of the attorney's influence over the
client's interests and affairs. 9' Correspondingly, the client must be
permitted to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time,
for any reason. 92 The right to discharge an attorney is judged to be
essential in upholding and protecting the personal nature of the
relationship. 9
Another factor which distinguishes attorneys from other employees is that while serving their clients, the attorneys participate in
confidential, and sometimes privileged, communications. 94 North
American's order to destroy discovery materials was allegedly transmitted by such a communication. The Herbster court did not explore
the meaning or policy considerations underlying the concepts of
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege. Further, the Herbster
88. Herbster, 150 Il. App. 3d at 26, 501 N.E.2d at 346.
89. Id. at 27, 501 N.E.2d at 346.
90. Id. at 27, 501 N.E.2d at 347. See also Neville v. Davinroy, 41 111. App. 3d
706, 355 N.E.2d 86 (1976).
91. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 28, 501 N.E.2d at 347. See also Elmore v.
Johnson, 143 Ill. 513, 32 N.E. 413 (1892).
92. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21,
28, 501 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1986). See also Tobias v. King, 84 Ill. App. 3d 998, 406
N.E.2d 101 (1980).
93. Herbster, 150 111. App. 2d at 28, 501 N.E.2d at 347. See also Rhoades v.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 78 Ill. 2d 217, 399 N.E.2d 969 (1979).
94. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustic Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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court did not identify or explain the discrepancies in treatment between
attorneys and other professionals who also participate in confidential
communications.
As illustrated by Herbster, courts and attorneys sometimes confuse confidentiality and attorney-client privilege.9 The two concepts
are distinct, but at times both can apply to a certain fact pattern.
Attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary rule and is a right belonging
to the client.97 The privilege applies only "where legal advice of any
kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as
such." 98 In such cases "the communications relating to that purpose,
made in confidence by the client are at his insistence permanently
protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, unless
the protection is waived.'' 99 This privilege protects the client from
having such information revealed in court through compelled disclosure. 1°° The privilege does have a major exception in that such privilege
will not apply to communications between the client and attorriey in
the furtherance of a crime or fraud.' 01 Communications within the
crime-fraud exception are subject to disclosure upon demand by the
court. 102
The scope of confidentiality is broader than that of privilege.
Confidentiality applies to all information about a client, not just that
received directly from the client. 103 In addition, the concept arises not
only at trial, but from the very inception of the attorney-client
relationship.' °4 In other words, privileged information is a subset of
that which is confidential. The crime-fraud exception also applies to
confidentiality, leaving the choice of disclosure to the attorney. 105
If the court in Herbster had thoroughly analyzed the facts of the
*case in terms of whether the information and setting involved privilege
95. See generally Feliu, Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against
Dismissal for Acts Within a Professional Code of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 149 (1980).
96. G. HAZARD

&

W.

HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING:

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

A

HANDBOOK ON THE

90.2-90.3 (1987) [hereinafter

THE LAW OF

LAwYERING].

97. See generally, Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client

Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
98. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at

99. Id.

554 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

100.

THE LAW OF LAWYERINO,

supra note 96, at 89.

103.

THE LAW OF LAWYERING,

supra note 96, at 90.2.

101. Id. at 90.
102. Id.
104. Id.
105. THE

LAW OF LAWYERING,

supra note 96, at 90.3, 93.
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or confidentiality or their crime-fraud exceptions, a different conclusion may have been reached. Because the lawyer would not be
compelled to testify in a retaliatory discharge case, the issue of
confidentiality rather than privilege would apply to Herbster. Within
the law of confidentiality, a charge of retaliatory discharge implies a
wrongful action or a crime. Therefore, the claim would seem to fall
into the confidentiality exception which would permit the lawyer to
choose whether to disclose information.
Analysis of privilege versus confidentiality theories is enlightening, but the court in Herbster chose not to closely examine these
issues. Instead, the court gathered the issues together under the catchall phrase "attorney-client relationship" and concluded that the client's
interests were protected from disclosure. The court deemed protecting
the attorney-client relationship more important than adhering to the
State Supreme Court Rules concerning the professional standards of
attorneys, following the state's policies concerning the discovery phase
of a lawsuit, or preventing the obstruction of justice.' °6
Illinois courts, by denying an attorney the retaliatory discharge
cause of action, have rendered the crime-fraud exception to attorneyclient confidentiality useless where the crime or fraud was known only
to the attorney. The evidence of the client's crime or fraud could be
compelled only in a suit brought by the attorney. The attorney,
however, would not have standing to bring such a suit except in an
action for retaliatory discharge in which he was an injured party. But,
if the courts prohibit all retaliatory discharge suits by attorneys, the
only way the evidence of the client's crime or fraud could be compelled
would be if a third party knew of the crime, sued the client, and
presented the crime-fraud evidence. As a result, the lack of a retaliatory discharge action not only limits the rights of attorneys, but it
also prevents attorneys from reporting crimes or frauds.
In summary, the appellate court did not fully explore the issues
involved or the policies underlying the availability of the retaliatory
discharge action to attorneys. 07 When deciding whether to extend the
cause of action to attorneys, the court refused to separate Herbster's
"employee" position from his attorney role. 108 The court viewed the
role of an attorney as being controlled by professional codes and

106. See generally Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill.
App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986).
107. Petition for Leave to Appeal by Appellant at 8, Herbster v. North Am.
Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986).
108. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 26, 501 N.E.2d at 346.
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rules and fiduciary responsibilities to the client. 109 Because of general
differences between the roles of attorneys and those of regular employees, the court chose not to extend the retaliatory discharge
exception to attorneys. 110 In addition, the court failed to adequately
present its reasoning with regard to the concepts of confidentiality
and privilege in the attorney-client relationship. With respect to both
confidentiality and privilege, the court did not address exceptions that
would allow an attorney to disclose information obtained through the
attorney-client relationship. 1 ',
The Herbster ruling has been subsequently applied in Balla v.
Gambro, Inc. 1 2 Balla was corporate counsel, director of administration, and regulatory officer for a firm which produced kidney dialysis
equipment. As regulatory officer, he monitored the company's compliance with federal and state regulations on the sale of medical
equipment and, accordingly, refused to accept and distribute certain
defective dialysis machines." 3 The day after Balla was fired, the
defective dialysis machines were accepted by the employer. "4 In spite
of Balla's claim that he was fired in his non-attorney role of regulatory
officer, the trial court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment, citing Herbster. 1
The ramifications of the Herbster ruling are apparent in Balla,
even though Balla is without precedential value. Illinois courts can
prevent employees from suing for retaliatory discharge simply because
the employees are licensed to practice law. No analysis need be made
as to the capacity in which the employee/attorney was serving when
the cause for discharge arose. Instead, the employee is placed into the
separate "attorney" category where the tort action is artificially
prohibited. As a result, employers can hire attorneys to fill any
position, and remain confident in their immunity from retaliatory
discharge suits.
IV.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE HERBSTER DILEMMA

The Herbster decision contains a loophole. The court expressly
limited its holding to the specific circumstances of the Herbster case.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 29-30, 501 N.E.2d at 348.

111. THE LAW OF LAWYERNG, supra note 96, at 89-90.3.

112. No. 86L-6148 (Cook County Cir. Ct., April 25, 1988).
113. Id. See In-House Lawyer Protection to Be Reintroduced in Senate, Chi.
Daily L. Bull., June 28, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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As a result, a different ruling would be possible if the court heard a
case with different circumstances. However, although the loophole
exists, the Illinois courts have not used it. For instance, the court in
Balla could have focused on the fact that the plaintiff was not serving
as an attorney when he was fired. Therefore, the policy concerns
regarding attorney-client confidentiality are not involved. Instead, the
court applied the Herbster decision to prevent Balla from pursuing a
retaliatory discharge claim.
Aside from judicial rule making, two other ways exist to create
a cause of action of retaliatory discharge for attorneys." 6 One option
is for the state legislature to enact a statute which specifically creates
such a cause of action." ' 7 In Illinois, however, such a statute may be
viewed by the Illinois Supreme Court as invading their domain." 8 As
a result, the court could isolate attorneys from using any legislation
creating a retaliatory discharge cause of action.
The second option is to modify the Illinois Supreme Court Rule
4-101(d)(4)"19 which provides that an attorney may reveal "confidences
or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself

or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct."'

20

The Illinois rule could be updated with the 1983 ABA

116. See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 566-70.
117. Illinois State Senator Arthur L. Berman sponsored such legislation in the
summer of 1988. Senate Bill No. 1877 proposed:
An attorney who is employed as an attorney by an employer in a full time
capacity and who is discharged by the employer because of the attorney's
refusal to violate the law or an ethical canon imposed on the profession of
an attorney may maintain an action for the tort of retaliatory discharge. In
such an action the attorney may reveal the confidences or secrets of the
employer, obtained by the attorney in his or her capacity as an attorney for
the employer, that are necessary to establish retaliatory discharge notwithstanding any law or ethical canon to the contrary.
S.B. 1877, 85th G.A. (1988). This legislation was passed by the Illinois Assembly,
but vetoed by Illinois Governor James R. Thompson.
118. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 5, at 568 (citing Frahm v. Urkovich, 113
I11.
App. 3d 580, 585, 447 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (1983) (Illinois court ruled that a
consumer protection statute would not be applied to attorneys because the practice
of law does not include conducting trade or commerce)).
119. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

supra note 9.

120. Id. Effective August 1, 1990, the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility
will be replaced with the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. As a result, rule 4101(d)(4) will be replaced with rule 1.6(c)(3) which states that an attorney "may use

or reveal ...

confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect the lawyer's fee

or to defend the lawyer or the lawyer's employees or associates against an accusation
of wrongful conduct." These changes are minor and do not affect the proposal
stated in the text. Full texts of these two rules appear supra at note 9.
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b) 121 which provides,
in part, that an attorney may reveal information that the attorney
"reasonably believes necessary . . . to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client . .. or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
22 This change would allow
the lawyer's representation of the client. 1'1
a lawyer to reveal attorney-client relationship confidences not only
when a lawyer is suing to collect a fee, but also when a lawyer is
trying to establish a claim in a lawyer/client controversy. This would
open the Illinois Supreme Court Rules to the possibility of an attorney
suing for retaliatory discharge.
Of the three proposed solutions, updating the Illinois Supreme
Court Rules presents the most promising approach to creating a
retaliatory discharge cause of action for attorneys. The judicial interpretation approach and the legislative approach have been unsuccessful in the past as indicated by Balla and Frahm. As a result, the
implementation of the 1983 ABA Model Rules for Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 provides the best avenue for allowing attorneys a
retaliatory discharge cause of action.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Herbster decision denies attorneys the basic right of every
employee to sue for retaliatory discharge. This decision has been
applied not only to corporate counsel, but also to those attorneys
acting in other capacities within the company. This decision opens
the door to unfair employment practices by which attorneys are
indiscriminately hired and fired simply because they lack the cause of
action of retaliatory discharge. This decision also provides unscrupulous employers with a ready opportunity to use attorneys for illegal
purposes. If the attorneys refuse to participate, the employer can fire
the attorney, confident that the illegal activities will not be disclosed
through a retaliatory discharge suit. Further, it seems likely that
employers would not encounter the threat of retaliatory discharge for
firing an attorney no matter what position the attorney held within
the company. These results are in direct opposition to public policy
which demands that the statutes and professional rules of the state be
upheld. This serious and far-reaching problem can be resolved through
a new interpretation by the court, legislation creating a cause of action
for attorneys, or implementation of the Model Rules of Professional
121. MODEL
122. Id.

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

supra note 9.

108
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Conduct Rule 1.6. Without some change, the corporate attorney has
less rights to fair and just employment than do any of his fellow
employees.
NANcY
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